Each application polices itself. The combination that actually enables fraud is assembled from parts that are individually reasonable — and no single system can see it.
The rule
Create Payments lives in the ERP. Finance File-Share Admin lives in the directory. Each was approved by a different team, and each is defensible on its own. The rule spans both and states the condition in plain language.

The evidence
Each side expands to the underlying grants — role, action, permission, authorization object or data-security level — so a reviewer sees exactly what makes the combination toxic.


At scale

Coverage
Rules evaluate the effective permission after inheritance and nesting are resolved, then normalise it. That normalisation is what makes a cross-application rule possible at all.
| Platform | Access is granted by | Resolved to | Data dimension |
|---|---|---|---|
| SAP | Single and composite role | Authorization object, field and value | Company code, plant |
| Oracle Fusion | Job and abstract role | Duty role, then privilege | Business unit, ledger |
| Oracle EBS | Responsibility | Menu and form function | Operating unit |
| SailPoint | Role and entitlement model | Application entitlement | As modelled |
| Microsoft Entra | Directory role and group | Role assignment and group membership | Administrative unit |
| CyberArk | Safe and account permission | Vaulted credential access | Safe scope |
Prevention
A read-only assessment returns a cross-application SoD picture of your estate.